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WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES 
Introduction 
Stopping a vehicle on the street is 
one of the most common activitl~s in 
a patrol officer's day. From the most 
routine stop an officer may uncover a 
variety of other crimes. Given the way 
the Charter has been interpreted by 
the courts, police officers must be 
careful When making these stops, 
particularly when a search of the ve-
hicle might become necessary. Any 
search of a vehicle may be deemed 
unconstitutional, especially if it is 
done without a warrant. The cases 
that have addressed the issue of ve-
hicle searches are, in general, quite 
confusing. Although there are a few 
underlying principles that arise from 
the cases regarding vehicle searches, 
the validity of any search is always 
dependant on the facts of the particu-
lar case. The most recent Supreme 
Court of Canada decision on vehicle 
searches, R. v. Belnavis, 1 did admit 
evidence from a warrantless search. 
However, the police must be very cau-
tious, since this case was very de-
pendant on the facts. This article is 
intended to help police officers gain 
an understanding of how the courts 
decide if a warrantless vehicle search 
is lawful and whether or not any evi-
dence obtained during the search will 
be admissible in evidence. With this 
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knowledge, the police can properly take 
action on the street. 
Lawful Search Issues 
In general, the courts address three 
issues when deciding whether or not a 
search is lawful under the Charter. 
First, did the accused have a reason-
able expectation of privacy?2 In making 
a determination with respect to privacy 
a court will consider the totality of the 
circumstances. If the accused is found 
notto have had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, then there will have been 
no breach of the Charter. 
If the accused is found to have had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
second question asked by the courts 
is whether the search itself was rea-
sonable? In R. v. Collins,3 the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that there are three 
elements that must be satisfied for a 
search to be reasonable: 
1. the search must be authorized by 
law; 
2. the law itself must be reasonable; 
and 
3. the manner in which the search is 
carried out must be reasonable. 
A warrantless search is considered 
to be prima facie unreasonable under 
s. 8 of the Charter. 4 
Finally, where a court finds that a 
search was not authorized by law, or 
that it is not reasonable for other rea-
sons, the court will consider whether 
the evidence should be excluded under 
s. 24(2) of the Charter. The key factor 
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or not the admission of the evidence 
would bring the administration of jus-
tice into disrepute. There· are many 
factors that are taken into account in 
order to decide this question. 
Facts of Belnavis 
Belnavis was stopped for speeding 
by an O.P.P. officer and failed to pro-
duce her drivers licence and registra-
tion. While Belnavis and a teenage 
passenger were outside of the car, the 
officer ran computer checks on the car 
and Belnavis. While waiting for the 
computer queries, the officer spoke to 
another passenger in the car, Carol 
Lawrence, who was still sitting in the 
back seat. It was very crowded in the 
back seat, as there were several full 
garbage bags on the seat beside Law-
rence. The bags appeared to be full of 
new clothing with the price tags still 
attached. Lawrence and Belnavis gave 
differing explanations to the officer as 
to the ownership of the bags. Given 
that Lawrence was cramped in the 
back seat and that there were conflict-
ing stories as to the ownership of the 
clothing, the officer believed that there 
must be more clothing in the trunk. The 
officer opened the trunk and found five 
more bags full of clothing. Belnavis 
was arrested for outstanding warrants. 
The car was towed to the police sta-
tion and the property seized. Belnavis 
and Lawrence were subsequently 
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MAKING A DIFFERENCE 
by Paul Tinsley (Police Academy) 
The Editorial Board and the Police 
Academy wish to congratulate Mr. R.J. 
(Bob) Hull on his retirement as Director 
of the Police Academy, Justice Institute 
of British Columbia (J.l.B.C.), and 
Associate Editor of Issues of Interest. 
Bob started out as a "poor farm boy from 
Saskatchewan" (as he always liked to 
say), and in 1956, at the mature age of 
18 years, began his policing career with 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(R.C.M.P.). Bob served in many 
detachments across Canada, both large 
and small, from the east to the west. 
As Bob always had an interest in 
training, he served for five years at the 
R.C.M.P. Recruit Training Academy 
(Depot) in Regina, Saskatchewan, and 
another five years in advanced training 
at Fairmont Academy in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. In 1980, after 25 
years with the R.C.M.P., Bob retired with 
the rank of staff sergeant and accepted 
a position as Program Director, Recruit 
Training, at the J.l.B.C., Police 
Academy. After a short term as 
Program Director, Bob was promoted 
to Deputy Director, and in 1995 was 
appointed as Director. For over 40 
years, then, Bob has served the police 
community. In his 25 years in recruit 
and in-service training, Bob has had a 
profound influence on policing, and he 
will be greatly missed. At the Police 
Academy, Bob introduced a tradition 
at the recruit graduation ceremonies, 
which is a fitting metaphor for a very 
distinguished career. Bob would close 
the graduating ceremonies by 
introducing a ceremonial piece of music 
(often heard in the military), entitled 
"Sunsef', by saying, "Let us all pause 
with the members of the graduating 
class and reflect upon their 
accomplishments and their future 
endeavors in the police service." Bob, 
you can now proudly reflect upon your 
many accomplishments in policing, and 
we wish you nothing but the best in 
the future. 
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charged with possession of stolen 
property. 
The Ontario Court (General Division) 
acquitted both accused. Crown ap-
pealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal,5 
where the acquittals were quashed and 
new trials ordered. This decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
The S.C.C. Ruling in Belnavis 
The Supreme Court of Canada 
looked at three issues. First, did 
Belnavis or Lawrence have a reason-
able expectation of privacy with re-
spect to the vehicle? Second, was the 
search reasonable? Third, if the search 
was contrary to the Charter should the 
evidence be excluded under s. 24(2) 
of the Chartet? 
With respect to privacy, the Court 
stated that a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a vehicle will depend on 
"the totality of the circumstances." 
Belnavis was found to have had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy as she 
had possession and control of the ve-
hicle and the owner had consented to 
her use of the car. Lawrence was found 
to have no connection to the vehicle 
beyond being a passenger in it. There 
was no evidence that she had any con-
trol or special privilege in relation to the 
vehicle. Thus, the Court found that she 
did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in regard to the vehicle. 
Therefore, s. 8 of the Charter did not 
apply and Lawrence's appeal was dis-
missed. 
Since Belnavis was found to have 
had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, and the search of the vehicle was 
done without a warrant, the Court found 
that there hadbeen a breach of hers. 
8 Charter rights (i.e. a warrantless 
search is deemed unreasonable). 
However, in considering s. 24(2) the 
Court found that the officer did have rea-
sonable and probable grounds to 
search the vehicle. The officer was 
found to have properly stopped the ve-
hicle for speeding and could reason-
ably search it for registration docu-
ments when the driver could not pro-
duce any ownership information. The 
clothing was also in plain view when 
he opened the door to speak to Law-
rence. The new clothing in the gar-
bage bags, along with the conflicting 
stories of the Belnavis and Lawrence, 
gave the officer his reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the 
clothing was stolen. The Court found 
that a reasonable person would con-
clude that there may be more goods 
in the trunk and quoted the officer's 
cross-examination from trial that "[Law-
rence] was crowded by the three gar-
bage bags and that any more stolen 
property would of course be in the trunk 
and it seemed logical in police workto 
check the trunk" [emphasis original).6 
With respect to the admissibility of 
the evidence, the Court also referred 
to the Stillman7 test in that the evidence 
was not "conscriptive". The Court noted 
that "Evidence will be conscriptive 
when the accused, in violation of his 
Charterrights, is compelled to incrimi-
nate himself [or herself] at the behest 
of the state by means of a statement, 
the use of the body or the production 
of bodily samples."8 On this basis, it 
was held that the admission of the evi-
dence located in the vehicle would not 
render the trial unfair. 
Further, in considering the serious-
ness of the breach in relation to 
Belnavis, the Court found that the ve-
hicle was not stopped and searched 
arbitrarily, the breach itself was isolated 
and brief, it was in no way deliberate, 
wilful or flagrant, and the officer did 
objectively have, and subjectively be-
lieved he had, reasonable and probable 
grounds to conduct the search. The 
violation of Belnavis' Charter right was, 
therefore, little more than a technical 
one. In this case it was found that the 
administration of justice would not be 
brought into disrepute by the admis-
sion of the evidence. The appeal was 
dismissed and the order of the Court 
of Appeal directing a new trial was con-
firmed. 
Discussion 
Police officers working on the street 
should follow the Belnavis case with 
caution. It does not give blanket au-
thorization to the police to search any 
vehicle that is stopped. The Belnavis 
decision is very much confined to the 
facts of the case. The starting point 
that must always be kept in mind is 
that warrantless searches are consid-
ered to be prima facie unreasonable 
under s. 8 of the Charter.9 The courts 
have decided that where it is feasible 
to obtain prior judicial authorization to 
conduct a search, that authorization 
is a precondition for a valid search and 
seizure under s. 8. 
There are a number of cases involv-
ing warrantless vehicles search where 
evidence has been excluded. One ex-
ample is found in the British Columbia 
case of R. v. Klimchuck.10 Theaccused 
was detained after he was seen by an 
Esso employee acting suspiciously 
around a gas station in the early morn-
ing hours. An R.C.M.P. officer found 
Klimchuck in a car a short distance 
up the road from the station. A C.P.l.C. 
query revealed that Klimchuck was 
suspected of having previously broken 
into vending machines using stolen 
keys. Klimchuk's vehicle was 
searched and a set of keys was found 
hidden behind a loose dashboard 
panel. Attrial, the officer who detained 
Klimchuck stated that he did not have 
enough evidence to support a charge 
before the search was conducted. In 
this case the Crown was trying to con-
vince the Court of Appeal to adopt the 
United States "automobile exception" 
for searches with a warrant (i.e. a war-
rant is not required to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment regarding a valid 
search and seizure). In the United 
States the courts recognized that re-
quiring a warrant was not practical with 
respect to vehicle, vessel or aircraft 
searches because of their mobility. The 
Court of Appeal in Klimchuk refused 
to follow the U.S. exception regarding 
vehicle searches, asserting that it 
would give too much power to the po-
lice in relation to search and seizure. 
The Court found that the accused was 
arbitrarly detained and the keys were 
excluded from evidence. According to 
the Court, the only time a warrantless 
search of a vehicle could be conducted 
was if it was done under some statu-
3 
tory provision where the law authoriz-
ing the search was also found to be 
reasonable. 
In R. v. Poirier, 11 the accused was 
lawfully stopped by police for an of-
fence under the provincial highway en-
forcement legislation. The accused's 
trunk was searched and illegal ciga-
rettes were found. At trial the officer 
did not establish in his evidence the 
requisite reasonable and probable 
grounds for believing that evidence 
would be found in the trunk. In this 
instance, the Court found that there 
was no cpmmon law or statutory pro-
vision that would authorize a search 
of the trunk. Since the car was 
stopped for a motor vehicle offence, 
the officer could only search the car 
for items related to the car and driver 
(e.g. registration papers, drivers li-
cence), unless there were further rea-
sonable grounds for a broader search. 
In R. v. Jones, 12 a vehicle was 
stopped by police because it was sus-
pected that the driver was impaired. 
When the officer approached the vehi-
cle he could smell cannabis coming 
through the driver's open window. The 
driver was detained for sobriety tests. 
His passenger was found in posses-
sion of marijuana. The driver was given 
a 24 hour drivers licence suspension 
and his vehicle was to be towed. The 
tow truck driver opened the trunk in 
order to access the shock absorbers. 
After closing the trunk, the officer 
asked him to reopen it. A substantial 
number of baggies of marijuana were 
found inside. The evidence was ex-
cluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
The judge found that in order for a war-
rantless search to be deemed lawful 
there must be a ''factual nexus" be-
tween the reason for the arrest or de-
tention and the place searched. The 
Court decided that there was no con-
nection between the drugs found on 
the passenger and the drugs found in 
the trunk. There were no reasonable 
grounds to believe that there would be 
drugs found in the trunk, simply be-
cause the passenger was in posses-
sion of drugs. The search was 
deemed unreasonable and the evi-
dence was excluded. 
There have been cases that have 
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upheld a warrantless vehicle search. 
For example, R. v. Stephens13 involved 
the robbery of a gas station at about 4 
o'clock in the morning. The suspects 
were seen getting into a vehicle and 
driving away. A police officer set up a 
roadblock a short distance down the 
road from the robbery. Two suspects 
were subsequently stopped by the po-
lice (at gun point) and advised of the 
reason for the stop. When the officer 
asked to search the trunk, the suspects 
claimed not to have the key. The of-
ficer later found the key in the trunk 
lock. The officer opened the trunk and 
found a handgun and some cigarettes. 
Although the car was towed and a war-
rant was obtained later to further search 
the vehicle, the issue was whether the 
original search was lawful. The deten-
tion of the accused and the search of 
the vehicle were found to be justifiable 
based on common law. The Court found 
that the search was "reasonably nec-
essary in order for the Sergeant to dis-
charge his duty," it was unobtrusive and 
a reasonable interference with the free-
dom of the suspect. The evidence ob-
tained was found to be admissible.14 
In another armed robbery case, R. 
v. Catroppa,15 :a suspect vehicle was 
stopped shortly after a robbery, near 
the scene. Since a gun was allegedly 
used, the officer relied on s. 101 (1) of 
the Criminal Code to justify a warrant-
less search of the vehicle. This sec-
tion allows for a warrantless search of 
a vehicle where a police officer believes 
on reasonable grounds that an offence 
is being, or has been, committed 
against the provisions of the Criminal 
Code in relation to firearms. Again, 
given the circumstances of this vehicle 
stop and the statutory authority to 
search, the search was found to be 
reasonable and the evidence was ad-
mitted. 
Finally, in R. v. Smellie, 16 the Brit-
ish Columbia Court of Appeal exam-
ined the issue of vehicle searches inci-
dental to a lawful arrest. This particu-
lar case involved the stop of a vehicle 
and the subsequent arrest of the driver, 
a known drug dealer. Reliable source 
information along with certain observa-
tions by the arresting officers (of drug 
transactions) gave the officers the rea-
sonable and probable grounds neces-
sary to take action. The vehicle was 
searched incidental to the lawful ar-
rest of Smellie, and the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner 
(e.g. no unnecessary damage was 
done to the vehicle). The drugs were 
found in the vehicle when the officers 
removed a loose door panel while con-
ducting the search. The Court con-
cluded that "in searching a vehicle as 
an incident of arrest the police are 
entitled to at least search the interior 
of a vehicle as well as the trunk." 17 
Further, the Court found that ''the 
search of the interior of Mr. Smellie's 
automobile for the purpose of obtain-
ing evidence which went no further than 
an examination of the area beneath 
the loose panel of the passenger door 
was reasonable in the circum-
stances."18 As a result, the accused's 
rights under the Charter were not 
breached. The Court dismissed the 
appeal and upheld the conviction 
(application for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was dis-
missed without reasons). 
Conclusion 
There are general principles that 
the courts follow when determining 
whether a vehicle search is lawful. In 
particular, courts will examine whether 
the person had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy (Edwards), whether 
the search was lawful pursuant to com-
mon law, statutory or judicial author-
ity (Southam) and the reasonableness 
of the search (Collins). If a search is 
found to be in violation of s. 8 of the 
Charter the courts will examine sev-
eral factors under s.24(2) of the Char-
terto determine whether the evidence 
located during a search will be admit-
ted into evidence. As a general rule, 
conscripted evidence, regardless of 
whether it is real or testimonial, will 
result in an unfair trial and will be ex-
cluded (Stillman). Each case will be 
decided on the facts known to the of-
ficer at the time of the search. Al-
though the Belnavis case may appear 
(continued on page 5) 
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to give the green light to warrantless 
searches of vehicles, it must be fol-
lowed with caution. While the Court 
did admit the evidence in Belnavis, 
there was a clear violation of s. 8 of 
the Charter. Officers conducting vehi-
cle searches without a warrant must 
have the authority either by common 
law or statute to search, and be able 
to articulate their reasonable grounds 
and authority during testimony. Where 
it is feasible to get a warrant, the best 
course is to obtain one, unless there 
are exigent circumstances. 
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THE FEENEY WARRANT 
Canada's Legislative Response to R. v. Feeney 
Cpl. Sheila Sullivan, B.A., LLB. (Police Academy) 
History of the Legislation 
On May 22, 1997, the Supreme 
Court of Canada ("SCC") handed down 
its ruling in the British Columbia murder 
case of R. v. Feeney. 1 The details of 
the case and the main thrust of the 
ruling were discussed in a previous 
edition of Issues of lnterest.2 Because 
of the implications of the Feeney 
decision, an application to delay the 
implementation of the decision was 
granted by the S.C.C. The federal 
government has now passed legislation 
to amend the Criminal Code to respond 
to the Feeney case effective December 
18, 1997 (the "Amendments"). This 
article will briefly review the contents 
of the Amendments. Under the 
Amendments there will be two possible 
processes for obtaining authorization 
to enter a dwelling house to make an 
arrest. 
Arrest Warrant with Entry 
The first process provided under the 
Amendments will be where the arrest 
warrant itself will contain an 
authorization to enter the dwelling 
house (new s. 529). This could occur 
if at the time the arrest warrant is to 
be issued, there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the person named 
in the arrest warrant is within a 
specified dwelling house. If that is 
so, then the justice issuing the arrest 
warrant may include in the warrant an 
authorization to enter the dwelling 
house (Form 7 has been amended to 
take this into account). The officers 
executing the arrest warrant would be 
under the additional constraint that 
they may not enter that dwelling 
house unless at the time of execution 
of the warrant, they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person 
named in the arrest warrant is in the 
house. 
Warrant to Enter 
The second process under the 
Amendments is to obtain a warrant 
of entry under new s. 529.1. Under 
this section, a justice may issue a 
warrant of entry (new Form 7.1) 
authorizing the police to enter a 
specified dwelling house for the purpose 
of arresting a party (named or not) if the 
justice is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(1) the person is or will be present in 
the dwelling house at the time of 
execution of the warrant, and 
(2) either: 
(a) a warrant of arrest is in force, 
or 
{b) grounds exist to arrest the 
person under s. 495(1 )(a) or 
(b), or any other federal 
statute. 
Exigent Circumstances 
The Amendments also provide for a 
warrantless entry into a dwelling house 
to arrest a person where exigent 
circumstances exist. There is a 
(continued on page 6) 
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pages 
statutory definition of what constitutes 
exigent circumstances, including 
reasonable grounds to believe that entry 
is necessary to: 
(1) protect any person from serious 
harm or death, or 
(2) prevent the imminent loss or 
destruction of evidence. 
The common law regarding hot 
pursuit into a residence still operates 
as another example of what would 
constitute exigent circumstances. 
Proper Announcement 
Proper announcement by a police 
officer of presence, authority and 
purpose prior to entry will continue to 
be required, unless there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
announcing entry will expose someone 
to imminent bodily harm or death 
(including the peace officers), or would 
result in the imminent loss or 
destruction of evidence. 
Telewarrant 
A telewarrant will be an option for a 
warrant to enter, and the provisions of 
s. 487.1 apply (i.e. the same procedure 
must be followed as for all other 
telewarrants). 
Conclusion 
This brief review covers only the 
highlights of the new Amendments. A 
Training Bulletin is available from the 
Legal Studies Section of the JIBC 
Police Academy. Please contact the 
Legal Studies Section of the JIBC 
Police Academy ((604) 528 - 5763 or 
(604) 528 - 5762) for more information. 
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ARTICULABLE CAUSE: 
POLICE COMMON LAW AUTHORITY 
TO DETAIN A SUSPECT ABSENT 
REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR ARREST 
Detective Steven Ing, LL.B. (Victoria Police Department) 
(Editor's Note: The following is a 
brief synopsis of an article by Steven 
Ing from the last issue in which his 
name was unfortunately omitted by the 
printer). 
Synopsis 
It is well-settled law that police pow-
ers are limited to those provided by 
statute or common law. The courts 
have also consistently recognized that 
a police officer's duty at common law 
includes the duties to prevent and in-
vestigate crime. Most officers will be 
familiar with the cases dealing with the 
random detention of motorists during 
"road blocks" or "checks stops" de-
signed to detect impaired drivers.1 
These cases have held that detention 
of a motorist in those situations, al-
though arbitrary, is justified as an an-
cillary police power (at common law) 
and is a reasonable limit on the right 
not to be arbitrarily detained under s. 
9 of the Charter. However, these cases 
were decided within the context of po-
lice roadblocks, which are clearly in-
tended to protect those who use the 
public roadways from the danger of 
impaired drivers. 
Another type of detention (where 
an arrest is not made) arising out of 
the impaired driving cases is detention 
pursuant to a breath demand. How-
ever, this type of "detention" only arises 
out of a situation where there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe an impaired 
driving offence has been committed, 
as a peace officer must have reason-
able grounds to make the breath de-
mand in accordance with section 
254(3) of the Criminal Code. 
What is not clear from any of the 
"roadblock" cases is when any type of 
detention outside of an impaired driv-
ing scenario will be seen as author-
ized within a police officer's common 
law duties, and specifically, in a situa-
tion where reasonable grounds do not 
exist. Although it is clear that there is 
no statutory power at this time author-
izing the detention of a suspect ab-
sent reasonable grounds to believe an 
offence has occurred, the decision of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Simpsor'f is particularly interesting with 
regard to the potential for "investiga-
tive detention". The case of R. v. Lal, 3 
from the British Columbia Supreme 
Court, has also upheld a detention and 
search without a warrant based on 
"articulable cause." It is recommended 
that police officers and departments 
explore the developing articulable 
cause doctrine based on advice from 
their respective legal counsel. 
Endnotes 
1 See, R. v. Ladouceur(1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 
22 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hufsky (1988), 40 C.C.C. 
(3d) 398 (S.C.C.); R. v. Therens (1985), 18 
C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). 
2
· (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (0.C.A.). 
3
· (Dec., 1996) Van Reg. (B.C.S.C.). 
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R. v.. Stillman (1997), 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) 
Common law power to search 
incidental to arrest does not extend to 
search of individual for biological 
samples - taking of such samples 
constituting unreasonable search and 
seizure and violating accused's right 
to security of person - While in custody 
accused blew nose and threw tissue 
away - police recovered tissue from 
waste basket and sent for DNA 
analysis - accused having refused to 
consent to provide samples - search 
of waste basket and seizure of tissue 
unreasonable - Any evidence, real or 
testimonial, that could not be 
discovered but for conscription of 
accused not admissible at trial. 
The accused, 17 year old William 
Stillman, was arrested in 1991 and 
charged with the murder of 14 year old 
Pamela Bischoff. The two had been 
partying outdoors with a number of 
teens near Oromocto, New Brunswick. 
Bischoff was last seen leaving with 
Stillman. Her body was found six days 
later in the Oromocto River next to a 
bridge near where she had last been 
seen. Bischoff died as a result of blows 
to her head. Semen was found in her 
vagina and a human bite mark had 
been left on her abdomen. 
Seven days after Bischoff had last 
been seen alive, Stillman was arrested 
by police for the murder. He was taken 
to police headquarters and 
subsequently met his lawyer while in 
police custody. Stillman had been 
asked by police to provide hair samples 
for DNA analysis, teeth impressions 
and a statement. At the time there 
were no Criminal Code provisions 
allowing for the search of a person and 
the seizure of biological samples. 
Stillman's lawyer advised police that 
Stillman refused to consent to the 
taking of any samples or impressions 
and that he would not be providing a 
statement to police. Despite 
Stillman's lack of consent, and under 
Cst. Robert Kroeker, B.A. LLB (Saanich P.D.) 
threat of force, the police took samples 
from Stillman. Police collected scalp 
hair samples by passing a gloved hand 
through his hair as well as by plucking 
hairs. Stillman was made to pluck 
some of his own pubic hair. Plasticine 
impressions of his teeth were taken 
as well as buccal swabs and a sample 
of saliva. 
Then the police interviewed Stillman 
for an hour. He did not make a 
statement, but sobbed throughout the 
interview. He asked to use the 
washroom and when he did so he blew 
his nose and threw the tissue into the 
garbage. The police recovered the 
tissue. 
At trial, the case against Stillman 
relied heavily on the DNA and dental 
evidence. The trial judge found that 
the hair samples, teeth samples and 
buccal swabs were collected in a 
manner that violated Stillman's Charter 
rights, but despite the breach the 
evidence should be admitted. He found 
that the bodily samples were real 
evidence and existed independent of 
the Charter violation. Further, the 
police had the right to seize the 
samples as incident to arrest. The trial 
judge found that the recovery of the 
tissue was not a search and, thus, 
there was no violation of Stillman's 
rights in that regard. 
Stillman was convicted of first 
degree murder. He appealed. The 
Court of Appeal of New Brunswick 
upheld the conviction. On appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada the 
conviction was overturned and a new 
trial ordered. 
The majority (Lamer, C.J., La 
Forest, Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci 
JJ.), found thatthe common law power 
to search incident to arrest did not 
permit the search for and seizure of 
biological samples. The seizure of the 
hair samples, teeth impressions, saliva 
and buccal swabs violated the 
accused's section 7 Charter right to 
security of the person and constituted 
an unreasonable search and seizure 
contrary to section 8 of the Charter. 
The majority ruled that the admission 
of the evidence would render the trial 
unfair and that it had to be excluded. 
The majority went on to find that 
the seizure of the discarded tissue in 
the police station also infringed section 
8. Where a person is not in custody, 
the police can normally collect and test 
a discarded item. Where a person 
discards an item it has been abandoned 
and that person no longer has an 
expectation of privacy in relation to the 
item. However, the situation is different 
where a person is in custody. When 
in custody, whether or not a person 
has abandoned a discarded item will 
depend upon the circumstances of the 
case. Here, the accused had refused 
to provide biological samples and the 
police were aware of that decision. The 
police could not seize the tissue 
without the consent of the accused. 
However, the tissue was admissible as 
evidence and the Charterbreach was 
not a serious one and the police could 
and would have obtained a warrant to 
seize the tissue in any event. 
In the course of this decision the 
majority entrenched a rule that 
unlawfully conscripted evidence (i.e. 
evidence that the accused is enlisted 
to participate in the discovery or 
collection of ) both testimonial (e.g. 
statements) and real (e.g. biological 
samples), which affects the fairness 
of the trial, must always be excluded 
under section 24(2) of the Charter. The 
only exception is where the Crown 
establishes, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the impugned 
evidence would have been discovered 
by the police by an alternative non-
co n scri ptive means or that its 
discovery was inevitable. 
This is an unprecedented extension 
of the right against self-incrimination. 
No other common law jurisdiction has 
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extended the principle against self-
incrimination to physical (or "real") 
evidence, except physical evidence 
that would not have been discovered 
but for the involuntary statement of the 
accused (commonly referred to in the 
U.S. as the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine) . The rule remains firmly 
confined to testimonial evidence in 
Britain, Australia and the United States. 
However, here the majority has stated 
clearly that any evidence, be it 
testimonial or real, that would not have 
been discovered but for the unlawful 
participation of the accused in the 
discovery of that evidence, will affect 
the fairness of the trial and must be 
excluded. 
R. v. Laurin (1997), 113 C.C.C. (3d) 
519 (Ont. C.A.) 
The police received an anonymous 
tip that the accused was growing 
marihuana in his apartment. Police 
officers went to the apartment complex. 
The accused's unit was on the ground 
level. The police went into the side 
yard of the apartment complex to look 
closely at the accused's window. One 
officer came within two inches of the 
window. Once there they observed that 
the window was covered from the 
inside, there was a bright light within 
the apartment and condensation on the 
window. The police officers then went 
into the public hallway of the apartment 
building and stood near the accused's 
door. There they noted the smell of 
marihuana. A search warrant was 
obtained and the accused's apartment 
was searched pursuant to the warrant. 
The police seized a marihuana plant, 
some cannabis resin and some growing 
equipment. The accused was charged 
with cultivation of marihuana and 
possession. 
The trial judge found that the police 
had not breached the accused's right 
under section 8 of the Charter to be 
free from unreasonable search and 
seizure, and admitted the evidence. 
On appeal, the Court found that 
while the accused had no right to 
exclude anyone from the side yard, nor 
did the police officers have any right to 
be there. The fact that the police came 
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within two inches of the window and 
visually inspected the inside of the 
window infringed on the accused's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
search of the window was 
unreasonable and that information was 
deleted from the Information to Obtain. 
Although this information was excised 
from the Information to Obtain sufficient 
facts remained to support the granting 
of the warrant. Despite the Charter 
violation and being excised from the 
Information to Obtain, the police 
observations of the window were 
admitted into evidence under section 
24(2) of the Charter. The Court 
concluded "that exclusion of the 
evidence would have a greater negative 
effect on the reputation of the 
administration of justice than would 
its admission". 
The Court of Appeal went onto find 
that the smelling of marihuana by the 
police in the public hallway outside of 
the accused's door was not a search. 
The police were entitled to be there 
and did not depend on the invitation of 
the accused. The accused had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to smells emanating from his 
apartment into the hallway. 
Statutory Provisions 
Bill C-17, the Criminal Law 
Improvement Act, S.C. 1997, came 
into force June 16, 1997 bringing with 
it the following important changes to 
the Criminal Code. 
1. The list of offences for which wiretap 
authorizations may be obtained has 
been expanded (see section Part 
VI, s. 83, Criminal Code). 
2. Section 487 has been amended to 
allow for the search of computer 
data bases and files. Further, s. 
487(2.1) authorizes the use of 
printing and copying equipment 
present to facilitate such search 
and seizures. 
3. Telewarrant provisions have been 
extended to General warrants (s. 
487 .01 (7)), and to DNA warrants (s. 
487.05(3)). 
4. A new "Body Impression Warranf' 
has been created granting police 
authority to obtain "any handprint, 
fingerprint, footprint, foot 
impression, teeth impressions or 
other print or impression of the body 
or any part of the body" (see 
generally, s. 487.091). 
5. The common law power to search 
without a warrant in "exigent 
circumstances" has been codified. 
Section 487 .11 now authorizes a 
peace officer to search for and seize 
anything, without a warrant, that he 
could obtain a warrant for under ss. 
487(1) or 492.1 (1) but, due to 
exigent circumstances, it would be 
impracticable to obtain a warrant. 
6. The common law "plain view'' 
doctrine has been codified. Section 
489(2) now permits a peace officer 
who is lawfully in a place pursuant 
to the execution of a warrant or 
otherwise in the execution of duties 
to seize anything that the officer 
believes on reasonable grounds 
was obtained through the 
commission of an offence, used in 
the commission of an offence, or 
is evidence of the commission of 
an offence. Offence, in relation to 
this statutory power, relates only 
to federal offences. 
There have been several other 
amendements to the Criminal Code 
not covered here. A Training Bulletin 
is available from the Police Academy 
regarding some of these other 
amendments. 
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